Hey Mr. Mayor
We want Our Public Historical Park and the Sport of Hang Gliding & Paragliding
Free from corrupted Private/City/Leaseholder racketeering enterprise
~ What were You Thinking Anyways ~
eagle wrote:Hey Mr. Mayor
We want Our Public Historical Park and the Sport of Hang Gliding & Paragliding
Free from corrupted Private/City/Leaseholder racketeering enterprise
~ What were You Thinking Anyways ~
majiemae wrote:Fellow Hawks,
This video is Bob's presentation to the San Diego City Council less than 12 hours after he was released from San Diego county jail for taking photos at the glider port of Gabe's nose. This is just more proof of what jerks those guys (thugs) are.
BigBird wrote:What, no GoPro on my glider or the wife taking pictures of me flying????? Is this a top secret site or something?? I've never heard of such tight requirements. BTW, Bob offered to introduce me to the site so I'll take him up on his generous offer (I might just put my full-face helmet on a little earlier than normal). I would opt for great flying conditions too, but then don't we always wish for primo conditions.
Philbrianscharp wrote:I've been wanting to fly Torrey Pines for a while now but I think I'd be walking on eggshells while I was there.
You'll no doubt have a much more relaxed time if you don't show up with Bob, pick stronger conditions and don't take photos. Although you could get free room and board the other way.
Code of Civil Procedure – Section 425.16.
(a) The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances. The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process. To this end, this section shall be construed broadly.
(b) (1) A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim. (2) In making its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based. (3) If the court determines that the plaintiff has established a probability that he or she will prevail on the claim, neither that determination nor the fact of that determination shall be admissible in evidence at any later stage of the case, or in any subsequent action, and no burden of proof or degree of proof otherwise applicable shall be affected by that determination in any later stage of the case or in any subsequent proceeding.
(c) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), in any action subject to subdivision (b), a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs. If the court finds that a special motion to strike is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, the court shall award costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to a plaintiff prevailing on the motion, pursuant to Section 128.5. (2) A defendant who prevails on a special motion to strike in an action subject to paragraph (1) shall not be entitled to attorney’s fees and costs if that cause of action is brought pursuant to Section 6259, 11130, 11130.3, 54960, or 54960.1 of the Government Code. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to prevent a prevailing defendant from recovering attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to subdivision (d) of Section 6259, 11130.5, or 54690.5.
(d) This section shall not apply to any enforcement action brought in the name of the people of the State of California by the Attorney General, district attorney, or city attorney, acting as a public prosecutor.
(e) As used in this section, “act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue” includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.
(f) The special motion may be filed within 60 days of the service of the complaint or, in the court’s discretion, at any later time upon terms it deems proper. The motion shall be scheduled by the clerk of the court for a hearing not more than 30 days after the service of the motion unless the docket conditions of the court require a later hearing.
(g) All discovery proceedings in the action shall be stayed upon the filing of a notice of motion made pursuant to this section. The stay of discovery shall remain in effect until notice of entry of the order ruling on the motion. The court, on noticed motion and for good cause shown, may order that specified discovery be conducted notwithstanding this subdivision.
(h) For purposes of this section, “complaint” includes “cross-complaint” and “petition,” “plaintiff” includes “cross-complainant” and “petitioner,” and “defendant” includes “cross-defendant” and “respondent.”
(i) An order granting or denying a special motion to strike shall be appealable under Section 904.1.
(j) (1) Any party who files a special motion to strike pursuant to this section, and any party who files an opposition to a special motion to strike, shall, promptly upon so filing, transmit to the Judicial Council, by e-mail or facsimile, a copy of the endorsed, filed caption page of the motion or opposition, a copy of any related notice of appeal or petition for a writ, and a conformed copy of any order issued pursuant to this section, including any order granting or denying a special motion to strike, discovery, or fees. (2) The Judicial Council shall maintain a public record of information transmitted pursuant to this subdivision for at least three years, and may store the information on microfilm or other appropriate electronic media.
History of statute:
1992 — Senate Bill 264 (Lockyer). For a list of organizations and newspapers that supported enactment of the original statute, see Supporters of 1992 Anti-SLAPP Bill.
1993 — The statute was amended to require award of costs and attorney fees to the plaintiff if the court finds that a special motion to strike is frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.
1997 — Senate Bill 1296 (Lockyer). The statute was amended in light of appellate court opinions that had narrowly construed application of the statute to disputes involving matters of “public interest”. In amending the statute, the Legislature clarified its intent that any conduct in furtherance of the rights of petition or free speech is protected under the anti-SLAPP law.
1999 — Assembly Bill 1675 (Assembly Judiciary Committee). Under the original statute, a defendant whose special motion to strike a complaint was denied could challenge the denial only through a petition for a writ in the Court of Appeal. Writs are discretionary, disfavored, and rarely successful. If, however, a plaintiff’s complaint were dismissed pursuant to a special motion to strike, the plaintiff was able to appeal the dismissal immediately. Thus, the statute was amended to give the SLAPP target — the person whom the anti-SLAPP law was designed to protect — the same ability as the filer of the SLAPP to challenge an adverse trial court decision. See also Supporters of AB 1675.
2005 — Assembly Bill 1158 (Lieber). The statute was amended to overrule the decision by the California Supreme Court in Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, which held that the trial court’s erroneous denial of an anti-SLAPP motion constitutes probable cause for filing and maintaining a SLAPP, as well as the decisions in Decker v. The U.D. Registry, Inc. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1382, and Fair Political Practices Commission v. American Civil Rights Coalition, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1171, which held that the 30-day period in which to schedule a hearing on an anti-SLAPP motion is jurisdictional.
2009 — The statute was amended to add section 425.16(c)(2), which provides that a defendant who prevails on an anti-SLAPP motion may not be awarded fees on claims of violation of the public records act or open meetings law.
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
HALL OF JUSTICE
Kenneth J Medel Judge
EVENT DATE: 02/21/2020 EVENT TIME: 09:00:00 AM. DEPT.: C-66
TENTATIVE RULINGS - February 20, 2020
February 20, 2020
JUDICIAL OFFICER: Kenneth J Medel
CASE NO.: 37-2015-00015685-CU-DF-CTL
CASE TITLE: ROBIN MARIEN VS. ROBERT MICHAEL KUCZEWSKI [IMAGED]
CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited CASE TYPE: Defamation
EVENT TYPE: SLAPP / SLAPPback Motion Hearing
CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: Motion to Strike, 10/15/2019
Marjorie Holland's Motion to Strike Pursuant to CCP 425.16 is DENIED.
The underlying case is a defamation and interference action. Plaintiffs are the lessors of the Gliderport in La Jolla. Defendant is alleged to be a former patron. He is accused of multiple acts regarding confrontations and harassing, vitriolic behavior directed at Plaintiffs and their employees. All the behavior is allegedly designed to disrupt the lease with the City and replace plaintiffs as the concessionaire.
The original complaint was filed in May 2015, alleging some 33 causes of action: two for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, 27 for defamation, and one count each for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief. In October 2015, Defendant/Cross- Complainant filed a First Amended Cross Complaint against Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants, which included the following claims: (1) assault and battery; (2) false imprisonment and arrest; (3) agency liability; (4) declaratory relief; and (5) injunctive relief. Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants deny all claims against them, as none of those claims have any merit.
The parties each filed Anti-SLAPP motions with regard to the complaints filed against them. Both Anti-SLAPP motions were denied. Both were appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed both denials. Plaintiffs sought obtained leave to file a Second Amended Complaint naming Marjorie Holland as a defendant in September, 2019. Plaintiffs' SAC alleges that Holland, at the direction of co-defendant Kuczewski, posted videos on the internet of Kuczewski making allegedly defamatory statements about the Plaintiffs. (Paragraph 7) Paragraph 21 alleges that Holland posted videos made by Kuczewski on YouTube. Paragraph 45 alleges that the acts by Holland (in posting videos to the internet, specifically YouTube), were acts of oppression, fraud, and/or malice and demanding punitive damages. Paragraph 60 seeks to impose liability to Holland for purported defamatory actions posted on a website (US Hawks).
Anti-SLAPP Law
Under CCP 425.16, the court makes a two-step determination: First, the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) 'A defendant meets this burden by demonstrating that the act underlying the plaintiff's cause fits one of the categories spelled out in section 425.16, subdivision (e)' If the court finds that such a showing has been made, it must then determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1) ... .) Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 88. "Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute--i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit--is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute." Id.
Does the Challenged cause of action arise from protected activity?
The Court does not need to rule in vacuum here. Defendant Kuczewski appealed this Court's denial of Kuczewski's Anti-SLAPP motion. The Court of Appeal, in Case No. D069836, in the context of Kuczewski's claimed protection under the Anti-SLAPP law, ruled that the activity alleged was not protected activity. The Court stated: "...none of [the] 33 causes of action alleged in the FAC arise out of any statements or other conduct in connection with any public issue or issue of public interest within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3) or (4)..."; "...we reject Kuczewski's apparent assertion [..] that section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1) or (2) applies to protect his alleged defamatory statements." Plaintiff argues that under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the Court of Appeal's opinion is law of case. Strictly speaking, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply because Holland was not a party, nor in privity in the Marien appeal, such that collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) in Marien cannot bar Holland's Anti-SLAPP Motion. However, while the doctrine of collateral estoppel may not apply, the reasoning of the Court of Appeal opinion is persuasive on the underlying issue of whether the alleged conduct falls within the protections of Anti-SLAPP.
Plaintiffs have alleged that Holland posted videos of defamatory statements about Plaintiffs without investigating the truth of the statements, without asking the proponent of the statement whether the contentions were true, and without conducting any investigation of her own. There does not appear to be an "official proceeding" here. As the Court of Appeal has ruled with respect to allegations against Kuczewski, "although many of his alleged defamatory statements were made during the non-agenda public comment portion of City Council meetings, the FAC clearly alleged that Plaintiffs do not base their claims for relief on his speech or other conduct during City Council meetings, but rather on his conduct thereafter (e.g., posting those statements on websites after City Council meetings)." The statements are not official after republication.
Holland argues that the statements were posted on a public forum and in connection with an issue of public interest. However, the Court of Appeal has already indicated that none of Plaintiffs' causes of action "...arise out of any statements or other conduct in connection with any public issue or issue of public interest within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3) or (4)." In order to be a public issue or an issue of public interest the statement must have "either concerned a person or entity in the public eye [citations], conduct that could directly affect a large number of people beyond the direct participants [citations] or a topic of widespread, public interest [citation]." Rivero v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 913, 924 (Rivero).) In this case, the causes of action are based on Kuczewski's statements about Plaintiffs (e.g., defamation causes of action), and those statements involved, at most, a private controversy or dispute between Plaintiffs and Kuczewski and not any public issue or issue of public interest. The Court of Appeal in Marien I has already indicated that the subject matter here is not public interest.
Probability of Prevailing
If the moving defendant makes that showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present admissible evidence to establish a probability of prevailing. (Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 965; Castleman v. Sagaser (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 481, 490.). The Court finds that plaintiff has provided sufficient support in the deposition testimony of Mr. Kuczewski and Ms. Holland to demonstrate a probability of prevailing.
Bill Cummings wrote:As a member of the public that wanted to fly Torrey Pines and realizing
that the City of San Diego and the Torrey concessionaire were the unholy
gate keepers impeding me, I looked forward to Margie’s videos.
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